Negotiable Instruments by Murray, Daniel E.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 22 Number 3 Article 4 
5-1-1968 
Negotiable Instruments 
Daniel E. Murray 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Daniel E. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, 22 U. Miami L. Rev. 585 (1968) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol22/iss3/4 
This Leading Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of 
Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................... 585
II. REAL AND PERSONAL DEFENSES .......................................... 586
A. Acceleration and Default ............................................. 586
B. Bona Fides and Lack of Knowledge ................................... 586
C. Consideration ....................................................... 588
D . Coverture .......................................................... 588
E . D uress ............................................................. 590
F. Election of Rem edies ................................................ 590
G. Equitable D efenses .................................................. 591
H . Equities of Ownership ............................................... 591
I. Fraud .............................................................. 592
J. Indorsements-Authorized and Unauthorized .......................... 593
K . N on-N egotiability ................................................... 593
L. Parol Evidence of a Defense .......................................... 594
M . Paym ent ........................................................... 595
N. Presentment and Protest-Waiver of .................................. 595
0. Statutes of Limitations ............................................... 596
P . Usury .............................................................. 597
III. DEFICIENCY DECREES AND JUDGMENTS ..................................... 598
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES ........................................................ 599
V. ACCOMMODATION INDORSERS, SURETIES AND GUARANTORS ..................... 600
VI. LEGISLATION ............................................................. 601
VII. LETTERS OF CREDIT ...................................................... 601
VIII. BANKS, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS ................................. 602
A. General and Special Deposits ............................... ... 602
B. Collection of Item s .................................................. 603
C. Joint Savings Accounts .............................................. 603
D . Totten Trusts ...................................................... 604
E. Sale of Collateral ................................................... 604
F. Garnishm ent ........................................................ 605
G. Ultra Vires Acts ..................................................... 605
H . Legislation .............................................. .......... 605
IX. BAD CHECx LAWS ....................................................... 606
I. INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the two prior Surveys of this field,' this article
will discuss the significant cases which were decided and the legislation
which was enacted dealing with the law of negotiable instruments and
banks and banking during the preceding two-year period, and then will
compare the decisions with the predicted effect of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. Legislation will be discussed under the appropriate headings.
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. The materials surveyed herein extend from
177 So.2d 328 through 201 So.2d 224 and the legislation enacted by the 1967 Regular Session
and three Special Sessions of the Florida Legislature.
1. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, Survey of Florida Law, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 416
(1963) and Murray, Negotiable Instruments, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. MIAMI L. Rrv,
225 (1965).
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II. REAL AND PERSONAL DEFENSES
A. Acceleration and Default
A person who has held a note and mortgage but has then assigned
them as collateral security for a loan does not have sufficient ownership
and control of the note and mortgage to accelerate payment and file suit
for foreclosure when these acts are done without the knowledge or con-
sent of the person who is holding these documents as collateral. The
holder of the collateral note and mortgage has the power to accelerate, to
institute a foreclosure action and to receive payment, rather than the
assignor.2
Although this factual pattern is not expressly covered by the Code, a
combination of sections 3-201, 3-301 and 3-603 should lead to a similar
result.
B. Bona Fides and Lack of Knowledge
When a payee of a check is the agent of the eventual holder of the
check, knowledge of the payee that the drawer is going to stop payment
on the check because of duress will not be imputed to the principal-holder
when the agent is acting for his own advantage and adversely to the in-
terests of the principal-holder.8
An individual holder who indorsed and assigned a note to himself
while purportedly acting as president of the payee-corporation six years
after it had been placed in receivership, five years after it had been ad-
judicated bankrupt and seven or eight years after he had ceased all official
connection with the corporation cannot be a holder in due course of the
note.4
In the absence of proof of fraud, bad faith or overreaching, a con-
trolling stockholder and officer of a corporation may purchase a purchase
money note and mortgage issued by the corporation to a third person
which will have priority over the lien of a judgment creditor against the
corporation obtained subsequent to his acquisition of the note and
mortgage.5
The U.C.C. should not affect the above cases.'
2. Laing v. Gainey Builders, Inc., 184 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1st Dist., 1966). See Soper v.
Stine, 184 So.2d 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), which refuged' to*link a note and mortgage on
personal property and a note and mortgage on real property in such a manner that a default
on the note and mortgage on the personal property would constitute. a. default on the note
and mortgage on the real property in the absence of some documents 'linking the-separate
transactions. See Althouse v. Kenney, 182' So.2d 270 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966), which refused
acceleration of the due date of a mortgage because of estoppel and- other equitable consider-
ations. ... "
3. Corporacion Peruana de Aeropuertos'y Aviacion Comeicial v. Bay, 180 So.2d 503
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
4. Pruyser v. Johnson, 185 So.2d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
5. Lake v. Pelican Enterprises, Inc., 183 So.2d 855 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
6. See U.C.C. §§ 3-302 and 3-304 and Comments.
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In a rather cloudy opinion, the third district has seemingly held that
when a finance company has taken part in the original conditional sales
transaction between the conditional vendor and conditional vendee and
the conditional sales contract and promissory note are simultaneously
assigned to the finance company, the finance company will not be a holder
in due course of the note when the conditional vendee proves a failure of
consideration in the underlying transaction.'
The fact that there may be a close association between a financing
institution, a manufacturer and a dealer does not necessarily preclude a
court from finding that the financing institution is a holder in due course
of a note (secured by a conditional sales contract) given by a customer
to the dealer which assigned the instruments to the financing institution.
Control of the financing institution over the dealer is the key, not just the
mere close association.8 However, when a financing institution exercises
such a degree of control over its dealer in the dealer's sales of goods and
the financing of the dealer's sales as to indicate that the dealer is an agent
of the financing institution, then the financing institution cannot be con-
sidered a holder in due course of the commercial paper received from the
dealer.9
Article three of the Code has not made any changes in the good faith
and lack of notice rules (first enunciated in the N.I.L.) which will over-
turn these three cases. However, under section 9-206 of the Code, a buyer
of non-consumer goods who signs a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement as part of one transaction in buying the goods will be held to
have agreed not to assert against the assignee (the finance company or
bank) any claim or defense which he may have against his vendor when
the assignee takes the paper in good faith, for value and without notice
of a claim or defense. It is possible, of course, for the Florida courts to
continue to adhere to the idea that the close association of the finance
company with the vendor prevents it from being in good faith or that it
has notice of a defense because of the close association. The courts
should, however, consider whether the sophisticated buyers in the above
cases needed the protection which a non-sophisticated consumer buyer
might require.'0
7. Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike Bradford & Co., 177 So.2d 878 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965),
citing Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1953). It must be confessed that the
reasoning in Martin was also obscure. It is not certain that the courts are denying a holder
in due course status of the finance company because of a presumption that the finance com-
pany had notice of a defect in the underlying transaction, or because of a presumed lack of
good faith by the finance company.
8. National State Bank v. Robert Richter Hotel, Inc., 186 So.2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1966). Cf. Mutual Fin. Co. v. Martin, 63 So.2d 649 (Fla. 1959).
9. Compare National State Bank v. Robert Richter Hotel, Inc., 186 So.2d 321 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1966) with National State :Bank v. Robert Richter Hotel, Inc., 188 So.2d 18 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1966).
10. See W. HAWKLAND, CommERc," PaER AND BANK DEPosrrs AND COLLECTIONS
211-213 (1967).
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C. Consideration
Section 52.08 of the Florida statutes provides that a holder of a
negotiable instrument need not allege in his complaint nor prove at the
trial that the instrument was given and endorsed for consideration, unless
the defendant shall deny under oath that consideration was given. The
Supreme Court of Florida has held that the provisions of this statute are
"in substantial part inconsistent with current practice (under the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure) and should for this reason be deemed inopera-
tive.""
The Code has seemingly made changes in the presumption of due
course holding which may cause some strange results.'2
The introduction into evidence of invoices or sales books of a de-
ceased payee of notes which tend to show that furs were sold to the maker
of the notes is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of consideration
and to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence to the maker
who asserted that the notes were given in advance of the shipment of the
furs and that the furs were never delivered by the payee.' 3
When the mortgagor fails to disburse money on a note secured by a
mortgage, then no valid lien may attach to the property allegedly en-
cumbered by the mortgage.' 4
Knowledge by a holder that promissory notes were issued for an ex-
ecutory consideration will not prevent the holder from being a holder in
due course.'5 This decision is entirely consistent with section 3-304 (4) (b)
of the U.C.C.
D. Coverture
The U.C.C. is not intended to affect" the Florida constitutional pro-
vision which requires certain formalities in signatures by married women
in order to charge their separate property for their husbands' debts,', and,
therefore, a wife who signs as a co-maker along with her husband and
another person when the consideration is received by the husband alone
is not liable on the note unless she signs the note in accordance with the
formalities required by the Florida constitution respecting conveyances
by married women.' 8
11. Biro v. Geiser, 199 So.2d 461, 464 (Fla. 1967), rev'g Biro v. Geiser, 193 So.2d 51
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1966). See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Marger, 184 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1966).
12. See the superb article, Beutel Interpretation, Construction, and Revision of The
Commercial Code: The Presumption of Holding in Due Course, 1966 WASHE. U.L.Q. 381
(1966) for a searching analysis of the burden of proof rule of section 3-307 of the code.
13. Hirsch v. Destro, 193 So.2d 14 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
14. Schenck v. Taylor, 188 So.2d 356 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
15. Mastry v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 185 So.2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
16. U.C.C. § 3-401, Comment 2.
17. FLA. CoNsT. art. XI, § 1.
18. Angle v. Crow, 184 So.2d 688 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
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A married woman who borrows money to pay a mortgage on her
separate property and gives a mortgage as a single woman to secure this
loan thereby subjects her property to the lien of this mortgage despite the
fact that it is not executed by her husband. In effect, the wife is estopped
from pleading her marital status when she has obtained money by repre-
senting that she is a single woman. 19
A guarantor of a note made by a husband and wife pursuant to a
joint venture by the couple may subject the wife's property to a judgment
secured as the result of a suit based upon the guarantor's payment of the
note; the rule that a wife's separate property may not be levied upon to
satisfy a debt of the husband has no application to a case involving the
joint debt of the husband and wife.
20
A husband and wife who execute a purchase money note and mort-
gage on an estate by the entirety are each obligated for the entire
amount.2
In Gulf Shore Dredging Co. v. Ingram,22 a married woman, without
the joinder of her husband, gave a note and mortgage on her separate real
property. Part of the mortgage proceeds were used to pay off an existing
mortgage on the property while the bulk of the proceeds was used to
improve her property. The fourth district held that the mortgagee could
could not assert a lien under the Florida constitution and statutes for the
amount of the money which was used to pay off the existing mortgage.
However, the mortgagee could sue to have the court place an equitable
lien on the property for the amount of this pay-off, and the lien could in-
clude the other money which was used to improve the property on the
basis that once equity acquires jurisdiction it gives full relief. The court
mentioned that if the court held otherwise, it would require the plaintiff-
mortgagee to split his cause of action into two suits, one for an equitable
lien for the pay-off money and a second for a constitutional statutory lien
for the improvements, but that this would be contrary to the full relief
maxim in equity.
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Texas law
of coverture provides a married woman with a defense to a Small Busi-
ness Administration suit to recover from her separate property the unpaid
balance of an S.B.A. loan to her and her husband which was negotiated
with knowledge by all parties that the loan contract would be subject to
the Texas law of coverture. The federal interest in collecting the S.B.A.
19. Smith v. Martin, 186 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1966).
20. Gallion v. Belk, 180 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965). If the debt is not a joint obli-
gation of the spouses, then the wife's separate property may be subject to the claims of the
husband's creditors only if she has given an instrument in writing executed according to the
law respecting conveyances by married women. Waechter v. General Mills, Inc., 181 So.2d
204 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
21. Marsh v. London, 181 So.2d 186 (Fla. 3rd Dist. 1965).
22. 193 So.2d 232 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966)'.
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loan from her separate estate does not warrant overriding the Texas law
in favor of the view that a loan from the government is a federal matter
which should be governed by federal law. Although the Texas coverture
law is different from the Florida law, the Court recognized that this hold-
ing might have impact on federal loans granted in Florida.23
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that
the constitutional prohibition against subjecting a wife's separate property
for the debts of her husband has no application when the wife executes an
indemnity agreement indemnifying a bonding company against any loss
it might suffer as the result of the issuance of a performance bond for
building construction work undertaken by the husband, when this in-
demnity agreement was the inducement for the issuance of the bond. 4
E. Duress
Duress as a defense to an action on a negotiable instrument need not
consist of physical pressure brought to bear upon the drawer or maker.
If property is held by a person and he wrongfully refuses to surrender it
to the lawful owner who issues his negotiable instrument to secure its re-
lease, the issuance will be regarded as done under compulsion or duress.25
Inasmuch as the U.C.C. is neutral in articulating the degrees of
duress and whether it renders an instrument void or voidable, this case will
not be affected. 6
F. Election of Remedies
If the holder of a chattel mortgage "forecloses" his chattel mortgage
by means other than legal action (for example, repossession and private
sale), he is precluded from obtaining a judgment on the note for any de-
ficiency. This rule has been extended to a case where the holder of a
chattel mortgage on an automobile surrendered the certificate of title to
an insurance company after the automobile was wrecked. He received a
check from the insurance company as a settlement without the authority
of the chattel mortgagor or the person who was in possession of the auto-
mobile at the time of its destruction.27 Section 9-504 of the Code should
effect the overruling of this cabalistic election of remedy notion.
When a subcontractor takes a promissory note from the contractor
and sues on the note and receives a judgment, this unsatisfied judgment
does not preclude the institution of a mechanic's lien suit against the
23. United States v. Yazell, 34 U.S.L.W. 4067, 4070, notes 23 and 24 (U.S. Jan. 17,
1966).
24. Kochan v. American Fire & Cas. Co., 200 So.2d 213 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
25. Corporacion Peruana de Aeropuertos y Aviacion Comercial v. Boy, 180 So.2d 503
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
26. U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (d) and Comment 6.
27. Boyette v. Reliable Fin. Co., 184 So.2d 200 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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property which was improved by the sub-contractor; the remedies are
cumulative and not exclusive.28
G. Equitable Defenses
When an assignee of a mortgage agrees to release certain property
from the lien of its mortgage in return for payment, and another lender
in relying on this agreement lends money secured by a mortgage on this
property, a court of equity will force the assignee to carry out its agree-
ment in order to protect the subsequent lender.29
H. Equities of Ownership
The case of Guaranty Mortgage and Insurance Co. v. Harris0 in-
volved an interesting application of the equity of ownership concept. A
payee-mortgagee agreed to hold notes and mortgages as pledges for loans
made by Harris to the payee-mortgagee. No formal indorsements of the
notes or assignment of the mortgages were made. Subsequently, the
payee-mortgagee indorsed the notes and assigned the mortgages to Guar-
anty Mortgage, which took without actual or constructive notice of the
prior transaction. At the time of the latter transaction, the notes were in
default. The first district held that Guaranty Mortgage took subject to
the rights of Harris because Guaranty Mortgage could not be a holder in
due course of an overdue instrument, and it was merely an assignee
of whatever title its assignor had, which was subject to the prior equitable
claim of Harris. However, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed on the
theory that Harris should bear the loss because he made the loss possible
since he failed to secure and record an assignment of the obligations or
even the physical possession of the notes and mortgages, and failed to
notify the obligors of the transation-if any one of these steps had been
accomplished the loss might not have occurred. 81
The Code has adopted the view of the first district and the seeming
minority view prior to the Code that the bona fide purchaser of an over-
due instrument takes subject to equities of ownership. 2 As the Code
states it: "Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to (a) all valid claims to it on the part of any
person; . . .,,3 And a holder who takes with notice that the instrument
is overdue cannot be a holder in due course. 4 However, it is possible to
28. Remington Constr. Co. v. Hamilton Elec., Inc., 181 So.2d 183 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
29. Dagnino v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 183 So.2d 846 (Fla; 2d Dist. 1966).
30. 182 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
31. Guaranty Mortgage & Ins. Co., v. Harris, 1.93 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966).
32. W. BarrroN, Bius AND NorS 456-462 (2d ed. 1961).
33. U.C.C. § 3-306 and Comments. See also Beutel, Interpretation, Construction, and
Revision of the Commercial Code: the Presumption of Holding in Due Course, 1966 WASr.
U.L.Q. 381, 401 (1966).
34. U.C.C. § 3-302.
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reconcile the Code provisions with the holding of the Supreme Court
of Florida on the basis that Harris lost his "valid claim" to the instrument
on the grounds of estoppel.
85
When cashiers' checks have been delivered to the payee to be cashed
upon the happening of a condition subsequent and the condition has not
occurred, the payee holds the checks as a custodian for the remitter and
as custodian may be garnished in a suit filed against the remitter. 6
The third district has seemingly held that a holder of a note and real
estate mortgage may make a gift of these documents without indorsing the
note or assigning the mortgage when the donor also executes a check for
the face amount of the note and gives it to the donee after writing on the
check that it is a gift to be paid for out of the proceeds of the note and
mortgage.8 7 Of course, the donee would not be the holder of the unin-
dorsed note but only a transferee. 8 However, the donee "acquires what-
ever rights the donor had."8"
I. Fraud
A maker who relies upon fraud as a defense to the enforcement of a
negotiable instrument in the hands of a holder in due course must be free
from negligence, and the illiterate maker's allegation that he had no
knowledge that he was signing a note and mortgage is vitiated when he
has made payments in accordance with the terms of these instruments for
approximately three years.4° The result of this case should be the same
under the U.C.C.
41
When a promissory note is given to a husband and wife as an estate
by the entirety and one of the spouses subsequently dies, the maker of the
note may testify as to fraudulent representations made by the deceased
husband in a suit brought by the wife to collect on the note and an accom-
panying mortgage over the objection of the dead man's statute.42 The
survivor of a husband or wife as to property held by the entireties does
not come within the dead man's statute, because the tenant by the entirety
does not take by survivorship but continues to hold the entire title by
virtue of the original title.
4
3
35. W. BrrToN, supra, note 32.
36. Equitable Life Assur. Co. of the United States v. Cassel, 188 So.2d 351 (Fh. 3d
Dist. 1966).
37. Lungu v. Walters, 198 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
38. U.C.C. §§ 3-201 and 3-202.
39. U.C.C. § 3-201, Comment 2.
40. Ross v. Richter, 187 So.2d 653 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
41. U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (c) and Comment 7.
42. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1965).
43. Gladstone v. Kling, 182 So.2d 471 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1966). This case also involved
some questionable applications of the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment
which are beyond the scope of this article.
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J. Indorsements-Authorized and Unauthorized
If a corporate payee's indorsement has been made by an employee
without any authority to do so and the transferee indorses to another, the
latter is only a transferee and not a holder in due course because of the
defective indorsement to the intermediate transferee.44 This case is con-
sistent with section 3-404 of the Code.
When an instrument labeled "Assignment and Endorsement" is not
attached to a promissory note in accordance with the former rule45 that
an indorsement must be made on the instrument itself or upon a paper
attached thereto, the transaction is an assignment rather than an indorse-
ment.48 The U.C.C. has continued the requirement that an "indorsement
must be written ...on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed
thereto as to become a part thereof."4
Under former section 674.11(3) of the Florida Statutes, when an
employee furnished his employer with checks bearing the names of
fictitious payees and the employer signed the checks without realizing his
employee's duplicity, these checks were payable to bearer and the drawee-
bank could charge the account of the employer no matter who indorsed
the checks.48 The confusing word "fictitious" has been eliminated by the
U.C.C.,49 which provides the same ultimate result by stating that "an
indorsement by any person in the name of the named payee is effective"
if an agent or employee of the drawer has supplied the drawer with the
name of the payee while intending that the named payee have no interest
in the check.
K. Non-Negotiability
A provision in a note and mortgage that the maker-mortgagor shall
not be held personally liable and that the mortgage will be limited to the
security afforded by the mortgage does not preclude foreclosure on the
ground that the mortgage is ineffective because it is not supported by an
obligation when it is a purchase money mortgage.50
The second district has held that a clause in a mortgage (it is not
clear whether it was a purchase money mortgage) providing that the sub-
ject property will be the only security for a promissory note and that the
makers of the promissory note shall not be personally liable is effective
between the maker and the payee. However, the court expressly dis-
44. Ederer v. Fisher, 183 So.2d 39 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
45. FLA. STAT. § 674.34 (1965).
46. Balogh v. Cleys, 181 So.2d 363 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
47. U.C.C. § 3-202(2).
48. Bay Fin. Corp. v. Bay Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 200 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1967).
49. U.C.C. § 3-405(1)(c).
50. MacArthur v. Merwitzer, 180 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
1968]
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claimed any consideration of the question whether the limitation of liabil-
ity clause in the mortgage destroyed the note's negotiability and if the
clause would be a sufficient defense against subsequent parties.51
There seems to be little question that any clause in a note which
limits the liability of the makers of a note to the security afforded by the
mortgaged land renders the promise to pay conditional and destroys the
negotiability of the note unless it is issued by a governmental agency or
unit or by a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or estate which
limits payment out of the entire assets of the issuer. Under this rule, a
partnership could issue a note and give a mortgage which would be limited
to its entire assets which might consist of only one piece of real property,
and the note would be negotiable.
5 2
L. Parol Evidence of a Defense
The parol evidence rule bars parol evidence of an extrinsic agreement
as to the mode of payment or the amount of payment of a negotiable in-
strument. However, a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement to con-
cede a credit or counterclaim as offsetting the obligation of a negotiable
instrument is a separate transaction which is not dealt with in the instru-
ment, and parol evidence is permissible to prove this prior or contem-
poraneous agreement.5 8
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the third district54 and
silently agreeing with the author's critique of the third district's deci-
sion, " has held that when a promissory note has been issued with the date
left blank, the note is payable on demand pursuant to statute56 and parol
evidence may not be introduced to show that the parties had agreed on a
different date of maturity. This decision will remain the law under Code
sections 3-108 and 3-118.11
A maker, when sued on a promissory note, may introduce parol
evidence to show that the note was not to become a binding obligation
until the payee delivered a promissory note and chattel mortgage which
arose out of a different transaction.
5 8
Parol evidence of past dealings betweenthe parties cannot be intro-
duced to show that the indorser of a promissory note did not intend to
51. Policastro v. Rudt, 180 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
52. U.C.C. § 3-105(1) (g) (h) (2) and Comments.
53. Little River Bank & Trust Co. v. North Am. Mortgage Corp., 186 So.2d 263
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
54. Schekter v. Michael, 184 So.2d 641 (Fla. 1966), rev'g Michael v. Schekter, 176
So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
55. Murray, Negotiable Instruments, Survey of Florida Law, 20 U. Mmm L. REv.
22,, 234 (1965):
56. FrA. STAT. § 674. 09 (1965).
57. See U.C.C. § 3-118, Comment 1.
58. Evans v. United Benefit Fire Ins. Co., 192 So.2d 87 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
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give an unqualified indorsement and that the indorsees, therefore, were
not holders in due course. 9
In Horvath v. Five Points National Bank of Miami60 the third dis-
trict dissolved a temporary injunction which forbade a bank to sell col-
lateral held as security for promissory notes because the holder-bank had
allegedly orally agreed to extend the maturity of the notes at the time of
their execution even though the notes contained fixed maturity dates. The
court based its decision on the ground that the makers had not tendered
into court the interest admittedly due on the notes. It is submitted that
the court was correct for the wrong reason-the holding should have been
based on the parol evidence rule that oral agreements prior to or con-
temporaneous with the execution of a note may not be admitted into
evidence to show that the parties had agreed on maturity dates different
from those expressed in the notes.
The parol evidence rule bars the mortgagor from showing that a
mortgage was given to secure the mortgagee on a construction bond which
it was to issue in conjunction with a building contract which the mort-
gagor was bidding on with the United States Navy (even though the
mortgagor alleged that his bid was not accepted and the performance
bond was not issued by the mortgagee), when the mortgage made no
reference to this alleged bidding.6'
M. Payment
Whether the cashing of a check which has a notation that it is "pay-
ment of account in full to date" constitutes an accord and satisfaction of
all accounts between the drawer and the payee is a question of fact. When
there are other accounts in addition to those referred to in a letter which
resulted in the issuance of the check, the check may not necessarily be
considered as an accord and satisfaction.62 The area of accord and satis-
faction is not clearly encompassed within the Code.
6
3
N. Presentment and Protest-Waiver of
When a negotiable instrument provides in the body of the instrument
for waiver of protest and notice of protest, all parties, including sub-
59. Roepke v. Kaenel, 182 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
60. Horvath v. Five Points Nat'l Bank, 182 So.2d 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). The special
concurring opinion of Pearson, J., expressed the correct reasoning in the opinion of this
author.
61. Smith Eng'r & Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So.2d 302 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1967).
62. Best Concrete Corp. v. Oswalt Eng'r Serv. Corp., 188 So.2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
63. See § 3-802 of the U.C.C. as to the effect of an instrument taken for an underlying
obligation, and W. HAWKLANO, COMMERcIAL PAPER AND BA'x DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
176-179 (1967) for a succinct review of the problem presented in the Best case.
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sequent indorsers, are bound by it.64 This decision virtually tracks section
3-511(6) of the U.C.C.
In a case decided under the pre-Code law, the second district held
that a waiver of presentment and a consent to an extension contained in
a promissory note was a consent to several extensions of payment by the
holder without notice to the indorsers. The court noted that under section
3-118(F) of the U.C.C., a consent to extension of payment authorizes
only one extension for not longer than the original period unless the in-
strument specifies otherwise."5
0. Statutes of Limitations
When a promissory note has been executed in California, payable to
a Florida payee, the statute of limitations of the place of performance
(Florida) governs and not the state of execution (California). Further,
the statute of limitations would be tolled during the time that the Califor-
nia maker was not a resident of Florida; an action against a foreign maker
will not be barred when the total time of his residence in Florida did not
exceed the five year period provided by the Florida statute of limitations.6
The U.C.C. conflicts of law provision states that:6
T
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state
and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that
the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall
govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act
applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this
state.
Under the above italicized wording, the Florida courts could continue to
apply the law of the place of performance of a negotiable instrument
rather than the law of the place of execution. 8 The Code has not at-
tempted to affect the statute of limitations of the various states insofar as
the bringing of suits on negotiable instruments is concerned. However, it
should be noted that the Code has provided that a customer of a bank has
one year in which to notify the bank that his signature has been forged
and three years in which to report an unauthorized indorsement. 9
The contract of indorsement is a separate contract from that of the
maker. Hence, when an unsealed indorsement of a sealed promissory note
is made, the five-year statute of limitations for a suit against the indorser
is applicable rather than the twenty-year statute on a sealed instrument.
64. Roepke v. Kaenel, 182 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
65. Bleakley v. Sarasota Bank & Trust Co., 194 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
66. Aviation Credit Corp. v. Batchelor, 190 So.2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), construing FLA.
STAT. .§§ 95.11(3), 95.10 and 95.07 (1965).
67. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) and Comments (emphasis added).
68. See Murray, The Stop Payment of Checks and the Holder in Due Course: A Con-
fliets and Comparative Law View, 8 B.C. INn. & Com. L. Rav. 225, 229 (1967).
69. U.C.C. § 4-406 and Comments.
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Further, even if the maker makes part payment of the note within the
period of limitations this does not toll the running of the statute as to the
indorser. ° The Code takes a neutral position as to the legal effects of a
sealed instrument and the statute of limitations."'
P. Usury
The Florida interest and usury laws remain unaffected by the Code72
and any action by the 1967 Legislature.
The "criminal usury" statute in Florida provides for a forfeiture of
both principal and interest. The "civil usury" statute provides for for-
feiture of double the amount of the interest. If both of these statutes are
given cumulative effect, a lender would, in some cases, forfeit all of the
principal and interest as well as an additional penalty based on a double
the interest computation. The first district has held that when the facts
show a violation of the civil usury statute and the forfeiture of double the
interest paid in fact exceeds the principal and interest owing on the mort-
gage, the separate usury statutes will not be given a cumulative effect so
as to exact an additional penalty in excess of these amounts. Further, the
cancellation of the mortgage because of its usurious nature prevents the
imposition of attorney's fees and costs incident to the foreclosure.7"
When a note provides for interest at the rate of five per cent per
annum and "this note and deferred interest payments shall bear interest
at the rate of nine (9) per cent, per annum until paid,"74 the increased
interest rate may not be assessed against the remaining unpaid principle
when there has not been an acceleration of the principal amount because
of late payments. However, the nine per cent interest rate may be assessed
against each monthly payment which was not paid on the due date.
If a lender and borrower orally agree to fifteen percent interest per.
year and the borrower pays this amount of interest, he may plead usury
even though the written notes fail to provide for any set percentage of
interest. The fact that the borrower may have suggested the payment of
usurious interest does not relieve the lender from a charge of usury when
he charges the usurious interest.75
A claim of usury will be unavailing when a retail automobile dealer
assigns all of its retail installment sales contracts to a finance company
70. First Nat'l Bank v. Davis, 193 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
71. U.C.C. § 3-113 and Comments.
72. See Fr. STAT. § 680.10-104 (1965).
73. Gordon v. West Fla. Enterprises, Inc., 177 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
Wigginton, J., specially concurring was also of the view that the instant transaction was
not within the purview of the Retail Installment Sales Act, chapter 520 of the Florida
Statutes, which provides for a higher rate of interest on the financing of sales of goods for
home, family or personal use because the instant mortgage was to finance an improvement
used commercially by the mortgagee.
74. Breitbart v. Zaucha, 185 So.2d 496, 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
75. Ross v. Whitman, 181 So.2d 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
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at a large discount since the transaction will be regarded as a sale rather
than a loan even though the dealer guarantees payment of the contracts.
7
A second mortgage note which provides for four periodic payments
of interest and two periodic payments of principal and the last payment
of principal is twice as large as the only other payment of principal is a
"balloon mortgage" under the Florida statutes,77 and it must have the
proper statutory notice imprinted thereon. If it fails to have this wording,
the holder will forefeit all interest provided for in the note, and the last
payment "is to be divided by the [amount of the] regular.., periodic pay-
ment and the quotient so secured is to be the number of . . . periods the
maturity date of the mortgage is extended. The mortgagor shall continue
to make such . . .periodic payments [as extended] until the principal of
the mortgage is paid."78
Section 687.05 of the Florida Statutes provides that any provision in
a loan agreement which requires the borrower to pay for charges "for
exchange" will not be computed in ascertaining whether the loan agree-
ment is tainted with usury. This "exchange" concept includes actual ex-
penses for making available at a particular place funds on deposit at
another place, but it does not include the difference in currency values
under the ratios established by international rates of exchange. Hence,
when a lender agrees to lend 25,000 dollars to a borrower and the bor-
rower agrees to pay for the costs of exchange this does not give the lender
the right to exact 2,500 dollars based upon the fact that the lender will
have to spend 27,500 dollars of his Canadian dollars to purchase 25,000
American dollars. Further, when the loan agreement and the evidence dis-
close that the lender knowingly and intentionally provided for payment
in an amount which would amount to usury, the burden of proof is on the
lender to explain away all legal inferences of corrupt intent.7 9
III. DEFICIENCY DECREES AND JUDGMENTS
When a deficiency decree is not requested or it is requested but over-
looked by the chancellor, the mortgagee may sue in law for the deficiency.
However, when the chancellor in one county expressly reserves jurisdic-
tion to determine the question of a deficiency decree in the future, the
mortgagee may not institute a law action in another county against the
mortgagor and then have the chancellor in the equity action terminate
jurisdiction in an ex parte proceeding.8"
The price bid at a foreclosure sale, especially when this price is con-
76. B & D, Inc. v. E-Z Acceptance Corp., 186 So.2d 29 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
77. Fla. Stat. § 697.05(3) (1965).
78. Bellman v. Varmark Enterprises, Inc., 180 So.2d 663 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
79. River Hills, Inc. v. Edwards, 190 So.2d 415 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
80. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Consolidated Dev. Corp., 195 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1967),
aff'g First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Consolidated Dev. Corp., 184 So.2d 471 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1966).
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firmed by the chancellor, is a conclusive test as to the value of the prop-
erty as between the parties in the event of an application for a deficiency
decree in equity or a judgment in law. As a result; if the price bid is in-
adequate as compared to the real value of the property, the chancellor
should not confirm the sale."1
In the absence of collusion, accident, mutual mistake, breach of
trust, fraud or other grounds, the mere fact that the value of foreclosed
property is approximately twice the amount paid for it upon foreclosure
sale is not enough to authorize a court to set the sale aside. 2
The third district has held that it is a proper exercise of discretion
for a chancellor to refuse to grant a deficiency decree when the value of
the foreclosed property is equal to the amount of the mortgage. However,
it was error for the chancellor to refuse to award a deficiency decree for
unpaid interest, attorney's fees, and court costs which exceeded the value
of the property. 3
If a real property mortgage gives the mortgagee the right to apply
any insurance proceeds resulting from storm damage to the payment of
the note and mortgage or to give the proceeds to the mortgagor, the mort-
gagee who forecloses subsequent to the occurrence of storm damage is
entitled to the proceeds of the insurance policy even though he does not
apply for a deficiency decree or sue on the note in law for the difference
between the amount owing and the amount bid at foreclosure.8"
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A judge may award attorney's fees of ten percent of the principal
and interest on a promissory note (which provides for the recovery of
reasonable attorney's fees) based upon the testimony of the holder that
it has agreed to pay its attorneys this percentage without any testimony
that this is a reasonable sum. 5
The maker is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees when the
holder of a note and mortgage has misplaced or lost the instruments and
is unable to deliver them to the maker upon his tender of payment and
the maker brings suit to reestablish the lost instruments.8 6 The Code does
not cover the above problems.
81. Southern Realty & Util. Corp. v. Belmont Mortgage Corp., 186 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1966).
But see, Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. The Connecticut Mut. Fin. Co., 202
So.2d 226 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
82. Guerra v. Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 194 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
83. Larsen v. Allocca, 187 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). See First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Consolidated Dev. Corp., 184 So.2d 471 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966) which involved two
suits for foreclosure and deficiency decrees-one in equity and one in law.
84. Sea Isle Operating Corp. v. Hochberg, 198 So.2d 336 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
85. Horvath v. Five Points Nat'l Bank, 190 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
86. Schwartz v. Biscontini, 187 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). It is to be noted that
normally the holder who has lost a negotiable instrument will bring the action-not the
maker. See U.C.C. § 3-804.
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V. ACCOMMODATION INDORSERS, SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
Although a wife is not liable when she signs a promissory note for
the debt of her husband unless her execution of the instrument complies
with the Florida constitution,17 she is liable when she and her husband
sign as accommodation makers of a note executed by a corporation even
though her husband has an interest in the corporation."8
A husband and wife who signed a note executed as part of a purchase
price of a business by a corporation in which they held stock, when the
word "individually" was typewritten after their names, are personally
liable as accommodation makers. The defense of the couple that there was
no consideration for their signatures was, of course, unavailing under the
N.I.L. rule that no consideration need be present to bind accommodation
parties.89 A similar result will follow under section 3-415 of the Code.
An agreement to pay the promissory note of another must be in
writing, and if a written offer of a guaranty of the promissory note is
offered subject to a condition precedent which is not accepted, the offer
is not enforceable.90
A guaranty of a promissory note in Florida does not have to be
acknowledged or witnessed. As a result, even if a guaranty were altered
by adding the names of witnesses and an acknowledgment this would not
be a defense to the guarantor because the alteration would not change his
liability.9 ' The Code does not require the witnessing or acknowledgment
of the guarantor's signature; hence this decision should remain effective.92
One who guarantees payment of a promissory note is liable upon de-
fault, and the holder is not required to first resort to the maker. Likewise,
a judgment against the maker does not affect the independent liability of
a guarantor. If two or more guarantors jointly and severally guarantee the
payment of a note, a judgment against one guarantor will not bar an
action against the other. Conversely, if the liability is joint, a judgment
against one guarantor will bar a suit against the other.9"
The Code reaffirms the rule that the holder need not resort to the
maker before proceeding against a person who guarantees payment.94
An interesting aspect of the law of guaranty arose in Miami National
Bank v. Sobel. 95 Sobel and other individuals were guarantors on a loan
87. See notes 16-24 supra.
88. Marinelli v. Weaver, 187 So.2d 690 (Fa. 2d Dist. 1966).
89. Marinelli v. Weaver, 187 So.2d.690 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
90. Juliana, Inc. v. Salzman, 181 So.2d 3 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
91. Morton v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 185 So.2d 172 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
92. U.C.C. § 3-416 and Comments.
93. Quarngesser v. Appliance Buyers Credit Corp., 187 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
94. U.C.C. § 3-416(1).
95. 198 So.2d 841 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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from a bank to a corporation. Sobel gave a mortgage on real property and
pledged corporate stock as security for his guaranty. The lender de-
faulted, and the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage. Subsequently,
the bank sued the other guarantors but omitted Sobel from the suit. The
other guarantors were successful in having the court relieve them of their
guaranty on the grounds of an unperformed conditional delivery and
other defenses. Sobel then brought suit against the bank based upon the
facts as found in the separate suit. The court held that the facts raised in
this suit could have been raised by Sobel as defenses in the foreclosure
action, and a failure to plead these defenses was not a basis for relief
from the decree. It would appear that if Sobel had joined the other
guarantors as third party defendants, the entire loss would not have
fallen on him.
VI. LEGISLATION
Section 46.11 of the Florida Statutes, which deals with the joinder of
makers, indorsers, sureties and guarantors of promissory notes, has been
amended and transferred to section 46.041 of the Florida Statutes.9" Sec-
tion 3-803 of the Code supplements this joinder statute and its provisions
should be followed by a secondary party when the plaintiff has failed to
join primary parties under section 46.041.
The venue statute for actions concerning unsecured negotiable or
non-negotiable promissory notes, former section 46.05 of the Florida
Statutes, has been amended and transferred to section 47.061.7
VII. LETTERS OF CREDIT
In Cooper's Finer Foods v. Pan American World Airways,98 a letter
of credit was issued by an American bank providing that a Latin Amer-
ican consignor could draw sight drafts on shipments of shrimp when the
shipment was accompanied by a "copy of non-negotiable airway bill of
lading showing consignment to First National Bank of Miami."99 The
consignor delivered the shrimp to the airline in Venezuela and received
twelve copies of the bill of lading. The airline returned the shrimp to the
consignor because of a lack of space on board the aircraft and picked up
eleven copies of the airway bill but omitted to pick up copy number nine
which bore the notation "For Sales Agent." The consignor then presented
copy number nine and his sight draft to a Venezuelan bank which made
payment on the strength of the letter of credit. The consignee sued the
issuing bank and the airline, and the court held that payment was prop-
96. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-254, S.B. No. 441. Former section 45.05 of the Florida Statutes,
which deals with the contribution rights of sureties, has been amended and transferred to
Section 46.011 of the Florida Statutes. Fla. Laws 1967. Ch. 67-254, S.B. No. 441.
97. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-254, S.B. No. 441.
98. 178 So.2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
99. Id. at 63.
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erly made on the letter of credit by the issuing bank because the letter of
credit did not require the presentment of one of the first three copies
which were designated as "original" bills of lading; the letter of credit
merely specified that the consignor must present a "copy." However, the
airline was negligent in not picking up copy number nine which bore its
reception stamp, and the undeserved payment could not have been made
if the airline had picked up this particular copy.
VIII. BANKS, BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. General and Special Deposits
A depository bank which credits a check to the account of a depositor
and permits him to withdraw most of the funds prior to the collection of
the check becomes a holder for value of the check and may sue the
drawer. This rule does not preclude the depository bank from suing the
depositor (instead of the drawer of the check) on the theory that the bank
has paid money for the use and benefit of the depositor.' The Code pro-
visions follow this holding. 01
When a customer of a bank deposits a check for collection and noti-
fies a bank official that the proceeds of the check are to be used to pay
creditors of the customer-depositor, the deposit is a "special deposit or a
deposit for a specific purpose,"' 02 and the bank may not offset obligations
due it by the customer after collection is made. In a general deposit, the
depository bank may set off any claims which it may have against the de-
positor. It would seem that the Code has countenanced a similar view.'
A corporation which opens a bank account by delivering a corporate
resolution with very broad powers to the bank has no cause of action
against the bank for the misappropriation of the corporation's funds by
the corporation's president in the absence of proof that the bank was
guilty of fraud, collusion or any negligence in the honoring of the checks
drawn by the president.0 4
When a check is made payable to a corporation and the president of
the corporation indorses the check as president and deposits the proceeds
in his own account in furtherance of his scheme to embezzle from the
corporation, the loss falls on the bank rather than the corporation on the
theory that the bank has paid without securing a genuine indorsement.
The president's indorsement then constitutes a representation to the bank
100. Florida-Patsand Corp. v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 177 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1965).
101. U.C.C. §§ 4-208, 4-209 and 4-212.
102. Bank of W. Orange v. Associates Discount Corp., 197 So.2d 858 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1967).
103. U.C.C. §§ 1-103, 4-201 and 4-208 and Comments.
104. S. & V. Corp. v. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank, 196 So.2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
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that his actions are proper, and the president is guilty of grand larceny in
stealing the funds of the bank.105
The U.C.C. has adopted a similar notion that the presenter of a check
(the president in the above case) warrants that he has title to the check
or is authorized to obtain payment." 8
B. Collection of Items
The Supreme Court of Florida, in reversing the third district, has
held that payment by a collecting bank to a husband who indorsed his
own name and forged the signature of his wife as payees of a check made
out to them as an estate by the entirety does not constitute a discharge of
the instrument, and the collecting bank remains liable to the wife for one-
half of the proceeds of the check. 07 The holding of this case is entirely
consistent with section 3-116 of the U.C.C.
C. Joint Savings Accounts
Generally, a co-owner of a joint bank account who withdraws all of
the funds from the account cannot be guilty of larceny unless the other
co-owner had a special property interest superior to that of the accused., 8
When a husband signs a "joint account" signature card for a bank
account but the wife fails to do so and then the bank allows her to with-
draw all of the funds from the account after the husband has been de-
clared incompetent, the husband must bring suit against the bank within
the three year statute of limitations rather than the five year statute. The
signature card did not contain any express promise by the bank. Hence
the five year statute governing suits on a written contract would not be
controlling. The deposit by the husband created an implied agreement by
the bank that it would pay the money or return it to him upon proper
written demand; hence, the three year statute was applicable. °9
The fourth district has given full force to exculpatory pass-book pro-
visions designed to protect a savings and loan institution. A man opened
a savings account with his stepdaughter as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. The pass-book provided that all withdrawals were to be
honored only upon satisfactory verification of signatures and upon pres-
105. Valassakis v. State, 187 So.2d 75 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
106. U.C.C. §§ 3-417 and 4-207.
107. Glasser v. Columbia Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 197 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1967), rev'g
Glasser v. Columbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 190 So.2d 799 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). For further
proceedings, see Glasser v. Columbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 198 So.2d 345 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1967).
108. Escobar v. State, 181 So.2d 193 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
109. Bambrick v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 192 So.2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966), construing
FLA. STAT. §§ 95.11(3) and (5) (1965). See Maier v. Bean, 189 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1966) for an extensive review of the law governing the creation of joint bank accounts and
the right of the survivor to the accounts on the basis of a gift.
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entation of the pass-book. However, any payment made in good faith to
any person producing the pass-book, either before or after the death of
the account holder, "shall be a valid payment to discharge the Association
in the absence of written notice that the book has... fallen into the hands
of unauthorized person or persons." 110 Subsequently, the stepfather gave
a power of attorney to his wife authorizing her to deal with the account.
Still later, the stepfather was adjudicated incompetent and his wife,
acting under the power of attorney, withdrew all of the funds from the
joint account. Subsequently, the stepfather died, and the stepdaughter
brought an action against the savings association. The court held that in
the absence of actual knowledge by the association that the stepfather
was adjudicated incompetent and in the absence of any notice that his
wife was not authorized to possess the pass-book, the association could
in good faith make payment to her and this would be a discharge of its
obligations under the wording of the pass-book provisions.
D. Totten Trusts
The guardian of an incompetent who, prior to the order adjudicating
his incompetency, established a Totten Trust does not have the authority
to withdraw the funds from the trust unless a court which has jurisdiction
over the guardianship orders the revocation of the Totten Trust because
the funds are required for the support and care of the trustee-incompe-
tent."'
E. Sale of Collateral
A former wife has no cause of action for conversion against a bank
which sold securities which she and her husband pledged with the bank
as collateral for a loan when the promissory note provided:" 2
As security for the payment of the foregoing note and/or of
any and all such liabilities, the undersigned hereby pledge(s) to
the bank... The undersigned, if more than one, shall be jointly
and severally liable hereunder and upon the foregoing note and
all provisions hereof regarding liabilities or security of the
undersigned shall apply to any liability or any security of any
or all of them.
Under this clause, the bank could sell the pledged collateral and apply
the proceeds to pay other loans incurred by the then husband of the ex-
wife. This is particularly true when the ex-wife learned that the bank
had sold the pledged securities and she made no complaint when she paid
the balance on the note in order to obtain the remainder of the securities
from the bank.
110. Millman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 198 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
111. First Nat'l Bank v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 196 So.2d 211 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1967).
112. Feledy v. Bank of Palmetto, 194 So.2d 625 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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F. Garnishment
A Florida statute"' provides that upon the rendering of a final
judgment in garnishment proceedings the judge shall award a reasonable
attorney's fee to the garnishee. This statute does not authorize the court
to award attorney's fees to the garnishee during the pendency of a case
and prior to final judgment.114
G. Ultra Vires Acts
A national bank is not permitted by law to guarantee the payment
of a promissory note in a transaction to which the bank is a stranger
with no consideration flowing to it. As a result, when a national bank
promises to purchase a new note given in substitution for an existing one
and the bank is not a party to either note, the bank cannot be held liable
on its promise.'
H. Legislation
Under an amendment to section 659.051 of the Florida Statutes, the
annual meetings of stockholders of state banks and trust companies may
be held either in January or February of each year in accordance with
the by-laws of the corporation."'
Section 674.4-213(1) of the Florida "Uniform" Commercial Code,
which relates to the final payment of items by payor banks, has been
amended by inserting the clause "and has not returned the item directly
to the depositary bank within the time and manner provided in §674.4-
212(2)" within subsection (d). This clause will aid banks in resisting a
claim that they have made final payment of checks by bookkeeping
entries."'
Section 658.07 of the Florida Statutes was amended to require that
state banks perform an internal audit every eighteen months and file a
copy of the audit with the State Commissioner of Banking."'
Section 661.13 of the Florida Statutes was amended to provide that
the comptroller may appoint the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
as receiver or liquidator of any banking institution which is insured by
the F.D.I.C. and which has been closed by the comptroller." 9
Section 659.20(2) of the Banking Code was amended to provide
that banks and trust companies may invest without limitation in bonds
issued by the State Board of Education. 20
113. FLA. STAT. § 77.28 (1965).
114. Jefferson Nat'l Bank, v. Cloverleaf Hosp., Inc., 194 So.2d 287 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
115. Ferguson v. Five Points Nat'l Bank, 186 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
116. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-30, S.B. No. 61.
117. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-172, S.B. No. 59.
118. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-182, S.B. No. 375.
119. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-247, H.B. No. 769.
120. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-261, S.B. No. 742.
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Banks and trust companies, under amended section 660.11 of the
Florida Statutes, have been authorized to invest managing agency funds
in a common trust fund established by the bank or trust company.' 2 '
Industrial savings banks are now required under an amendment to
section 656.18 of the Florida Statutes to hold only first mortgages with
the exception of second mortgages which are held as additional security.
Secondary liens which are made under the provisions of the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944 will not be considered as second mortgages,
and they may be held by industrial savings banks. 22
Under an amendment to section 660.12 of the Florida Statutes, the
prohibition of banks and trust companies from investing common trust
funds in mortgages has been eliminated.2 3
Domestic savings and loan associations which are members of the
federal home loan bank system and are also insured by the federal gov-
ernment may now (with the approval of the state comptroller) make
loans or investments in the same manner as federal savings and loan as-
sociations. 1
24
Banks and trust companies may now grant stock options to their em-
ployees; however, no more than ten percent of the par value of stock
may be set aside for this purpose.' 25
IX. BAD CHECK LAWS
Section 674.19(1) of the Florida Statutes formerly provided that
"where the sum payable is expressed in words and also in figures and
there is a discrepancy between the two, the sum denoted by the words
is the sum payable." As a result, the second district has held that when a
person alters the marginal figures on the check but does not alter the
amount payable as called for by the words, there is no forgery. 2 The
Code provides a different approach: "Words control figures except that if
the words are ambiguous, figures control." 27
Florida Statutes, section 832.05, which makes it a crime to pass
worthless checks, has been held to be constitutional.1
28
A conviction for uttering a forged instrument in violation of section
831.02 of the Florida Statutes based upon the premise that proof of
121. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-365, S.B. No. 316.
122. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-382, H.B. No. 749.
123. Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-336, S.B. No. 682.
124. FLA. STAT. § 665.21(9), as amended, Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-95, S.B. No. 469.
125. FLA. STAT. § 659.08, as amended, Fla. Laws 1967 ch. 67-582, S.B. No. 1406.
126. State v. Peterson, 192 So.2d 293 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
127. U.C.C. § 3-118(c). If the Code had been in effect at the time of this act, the ac-
cused might have been found guilty.
128. Snyder v. State, 196 So.2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
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falsity of the instrument may be presumed from proof that the maker of
the instrument is a fictitious person must be reversed when there is in-
adequate proof that the maker of the instrument is a fictitious person.
This proof is inadequate when it is based upon the testimony of an in-
vestigating officer that he was unable to find the business establishment
of the alleged maker because it failed to show the extent of the investiga-
tion. This is especially true when the record reveals that the business
establishment did have an account in the bank at a time prior to the date
of the alleged offense.129
A person who has possession of stolen traveler's checks and fills in a
fictitious name as the name of the purchaser and then signs this same
fictitious name for a fraudulent purpose may be guilty of forgery and of
uttering a forged instrument under the criminal laws. 30
129. Maura v. State, 181 So.2d 231 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
130. Folk v. State, 192 So.2d 44 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966), construing FLA. STAT. §§ 831.01
and 831.02 (1965).
